SUMMARY
by robots and laws in robots 11 . Accordingly, in the search of the ways to reconcile regulation and technology, the need to turn to the fundamental roots of the regulation framework per se is obvious. Which of the regulation alternatives would be the most efficient and just in the context of singularity age's probability? In other words, the issue is whether humans are and will remain to be more efficient regulators than intelligent machines and if not, is it safe to delegate the regulation activities to that kind of artificial object (or subject).
The first part of the issue is too obvious to consider it in depth. Undisputedly, within the context of singularity scenario, only intelligent machines have the real potential to decide on thousands of issues within the fraction of the second; using the unbiased knowledge, wisdom and understanding of thousands of greatest minds; for a cost of a cup of tea. The second part of the issue is far more complex.
Singularity scenario may come with the success story of evolution and enhancement in all fields of human mental and physical activities. However it may also be a story of existential risk, that we have been warned about by the Future of Life Institute and by an open letter, signed by more than 8000 other leading opinion leaders and scholars in "ranges from economics, law and philosophy to computer security, formal methods and, of course, various branches of AI itself"
12 . Naturally, besides the welfare enhancing technologies, the cyber security threats also evolve with the same exponential scope. Indeed, while one narrative touts the benefits of the greatest technological developments and bright future of cyber dependent opportunities, other warns the World of cyber-activism (hacktivism), cybercrime, cyberespionage, cyberwar and cyber-terrorism 13 . Even cyber murder may become a reality since cyber-dependent medical technology is a likely target. The ongoing cyberwar does not require expensive soldiers, arms and ammunition. It is a war of sophisticated algorithms operating from advanced, lightning-fast computers. It is a war without any territorial and geographic borders. For these and other reasons cyber security is in urge of a Manhattan Project -a digital nuclear option, capable of swiftly inflicting grievous damage while simultaneously safeguarding the cyber systems of its motherland 14 . In sum, having introduced the concept of singularity age and related issues, the problem is that it is unclear what regulation framework should be used to regulate the cyber security in the context of emerging legal technologies thereof.
Therefore the aim of this paper is to develop the conceptual cyber-security regulation framework and evaluate it in the context of emerging legal technologies thereof.
Thus, the object of this research is regulation of cyber security. In order to achieve the aim of this research and to solve the problem, these tasks has been formed: 1) To uncover the status quo of cyber security problem 2)
To develop the conceptual cyber-security regulation framework 3) To evaluate the proposed framework in the context of emerging legal technologies 11 R. Leenes (16) , 2017, p. 34-57 Accordingly, three parts of this paper are presented below. The analysis of the status quo of cyber security problem is presented in the first part. The second part is dedicated to the development of the conceptual cyber-security regulation framework. Finally, in lieu of conclusions, the proposed concept is evaluated in the context of emerging legal technologies, thus contributing to the knowledge, wisdom and understanding of regulation issues in the context of technological evolution.
THE STATUS QUO OF CYBER SECURITY PROBLEM
It is beyond any reasonable doubt that cyber security of cyber ecosystem has become one the major threats to the World 15 . The exponentially increased use of software and digital services with asymmetrical distribution of security measures, possesses major economic and political threats. To name just a few, cyberwars, espionage, ransomware, DDoS attacks, blackmail and fraud, phishing, large data leaks, and other financially or politically motivated attacks have become an exponentially growing, unsolvable, everyday problem of law and economics. Cybercrimes differ from traditional crimes, because perpetrators are more difficult to track, economies of scale are larger and it is easier for cyber criminals to operate on an international scale 16 . The threat streams from private data of individual to the critical infrastructure and governments. There is no immunity. Indeed, the World has been hacked and the chances of being caught are small.
Some high-profile cyber-attacks are highlighting these risks and costs. In 2013 Target has lost approximately 40 million credit and debit card accounts, costing Target approximately $250 million. In 2014, a hack at Sony Corp. exposed Hollywood secrets. In 2015, the adult-themed, extramarital affair website Ashley Madison was hacked exposing the personal information of some 32 million users 17 . AdultFriendFinder followed with 412 million accounts loss in 2016. 1,5 billion accounts of Yahoo has been compromised in 2013 and 2014 attacks, LinkedIn has lost 165 million in 2012, Dropbox -68 million in 2013 18 , etc. The United States government has lost background investigation records of millions of current, former, and prospective federal employees and contractors, including the fingerprints of 5.6 million federal employees in 2014 attack that lasted for several months 19 . 2016 breaches also included the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation 20 . According to "The Global Risks Report 2016," from the World Economic Forum, detectable crimes in cyberspace cost the global economy an estimated 445 billion USD in 2014 21 . There were no signs of slowing down in 2015 and a forecast for 2019 estimates up to 15 23 as in Figure 1 :
Cyber security incidents by attack type, time and impact (source: IBM XForce Threat Intelligence Index 2017 report)
Nevertheless, the problem is much bigger. World is cyber dependent. Airports, cars, hospitals, stock markets, power grids are run by computers and these computers are shockingly vulnerable to cyber-terrorist attack. An attack of sufficient strength could destabilize a country's economic or military apparatus without the need for armed conflict. This requires a completely different framework for prevention or response than one for kinetic warfare, where physical actions are taken against physical targets. That is not to say that casualties in cyberwar are impossible. Cyber attacks on power grids and communications have the ability to cause kinetic effects directly, damaging physical infrastructure. For example in March of 2015, Iran launched a cyberattack against Turkey's power grid that shut down power systems in over half the nation's provinces 24 . These cyber security risks of cyber dependency raise two main challenges for the legal systems tailored to regulate the 'real world' behaviour. These are the jurisdictional fragmentation and attribution of behaviour. The first one follows from the global nature of cyberspace. Jurisdiction of a sovereign state is limited and protected by rules of customary public international law. The latter follows from the problems in determining the responsibility for harmful conduct in cyberspace. The asymmetry of the cause-effect relationship in the internet does not allow distinguishing with ease between participants standing behind an attack -an individual or a government 25 . Typical attempts to improve cybersecurity through regulation involve enhancement of capabilities to collect and share information about cybersecurity threats. However, 22 Cybercrime will cost businesses over $2 trillion by 2019, (Juniper Research, 2015) https://www.juniperresearch.com/press/press-releases/cybercrime-cost-businesses-over-2trillion, accessed 2017-05-01, 23 (16), 2017, p. 34-57 cybersecurity regulation takes place within complex ecosystems, where stakeholders from diverse societies, having distributed responsibilities, diverse problems and challenges, make it difficult to initiate collective action. Therefore, cybersecurity is the sea of paradoxes, where the choosing of one direction can be at the expense of another direction, while the obligation of government is to go both ways 26 . The major cyber security paradox stems from the classical tension between security and privacy. In order for governments to ensure cybersecurity, they need to access the data of individuals and organizations for surveillance purposes. That is, capability to preclude or react to the cyber-attack increases as privacy barriers decrease. Therefore security and privacy are opposite vectors, although the obligation of government is to ensure both. The heated discussion about the legitimate balance between national security and information privacy, intensified by the Snowden leaks, has been going on for several years. 27 Another important paradox stems from the realization that the same data that can be used to improve the quality of life can also be used against citizens, as was revealed by Snowden and other whistleblowers. Bruijn 28 classified some of other most common cybersecurity policies -making paradoxes in accordance to the policy issues they emerge from. What is the desired level of protection of systems? How much (cross-border) collaboration is necessary to fight cybersecurity? Who to fight to? What is the right amount of spending on cybersecurity? What is the right level of visibility? Who should ensure the cybersecurity of systems? Thus, cyber law is a new, complex and greatly diversified field of law.
The European Commission has also expressed understanding that there are still gaps across the EU, notably in terms of national capabilities, coordination in cases of cyber incidents spanning across borders, and in terms of private sector involvement and preparedness 29 . To help address this, the 2013 EU Cyber Security Strategy asks The European Union Agency for Network and Information Security 30 to "encourage good practice in information and network security" to assist and support Member States in developing strong national cyber resilience capabilities, notably by building expertise on security and resilience of industrial control systems, transport and energy infrastructure. Thus, 18 European Union Member States have published National Cyber Security Strategies as a key policy feature, helping them to tackle risks that have the potential to undermine the achievement of economic and social benefits from cyberspace 31 . However, despite the high-sounding wording of the strategies, growing amount of cyber security cases and research in the field, the problem is far from solved. Cyber attacks remain among the biggest threats to people, businesses, governments and other institutions. Moreover, the technology upon which all these strategies and security tools are developed 26 H. Bruijn, M. Jansen, 'Building cybersecurity awareness: The need for evidence-based framing strategies', Government Information Quarterly 34 (2017) 30 The European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) is a centre of network and information security expertise for the EU, its Member States, the private sector and Europe's citizens (www.enisa.europa.eu) 31 European Union Agency for Network and Information Security, An evaluation Framework for National Cyber Security Strategies, (2014).
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Teisės apžvalga Law review No. 2 (16), 2017, p. 34-57 might very soon be outdated. It is expected to meet 2020 with 24 billion interconnected devices, with different security techniques and policy requirements applied by producers, thus making security challenges more difficult to fulfil as it is hard to develop a generic "one fits all" security strategy or model 32 . Clearly, the cyber-dependent World needs the Cyber Manhattan Project.
Since security and privacy are at the opposite ends of the same problem, the digital nuclear option may be developed either from the perspective of security or privacy.
The first option involves a breakthrough in computing power and intelligence of the technologies used for security of data-driven world. However, such evolution would also open new possibilities for the development of hacking tools, as faster and smarter technologies will be accessible to the wrongdoers too. Moreover, technological singularity may not be reached in another 30 years. Therefore, security perspective option will not be accessible soon enough and (most likely) will not diminish the cyber security risks at the speed and scope needed for it to be treated as a nuclear option.
The second option is to reinvent the privacy law. This perspective has some major deviations from the technological advancement option described above. Security and privacy are opposite vectors, thus abilities to preclude or react to the cyber-attacks increase as privacy barriers decrease, even with the status quo in computation power and intelligence of the technologies. However, technological advancement is exponential, while the development of privacy law remains linear and slow. Thus the governments are urged to find a way for selfgovernance or to speed up, at a major scale, the regulatory procedures and decisions thereof. Finally, the law may be changed with the stroke of a regular pen. Therefore privacy perspective option is accessible and it may diminish the cyber security risks even with the status quo in computation power and intelligence of the technologies. Moreover, it may solve an ancillary issue of the governance efficiency.
Of course, there is an undefined set of third options, encompassing a mix of both: advancement of technologies while sustainably reaching for a trust-free governance system that would allow decreasing cyber security related privacy barriers.
CONCEPTUAL CYBER SECURITY REGULATION FRAMEWORK
Economic theories are increasingly used to explain cyber-security problems. In this vain, the field has been studied using such concepts as behavioural economics, asymmetric information, externalities and market failures framework 33 . Based on these theories, many various new behavioural models, networks and action research methodological advances in cybercrime and privacy economics are developed 34 According to the general theory of regulation, regulators should intervene where market fails, aiming to fix these failures 35 . Market failures and resulting costs are the centerpiece of Transaction Cost Economics -one of the dominant economic theories of the XXI century 36 , having a single transaction as a unit of analysis. Transaction unit is described as a process of exchanging scarce resources 37 . This exchange is a result of ones actions, caused due to some behavioral incentives (motives). Accordingly, transaction unit has its motive (incentive), action (manifest of the will through activity or silence) and result elements, as shown in Figure 2 . 40 The theorem has been stated in numerous ways and is subject to an enormous amount of theoretical and empirical controversy 41 . The general claims of this theory may be summarized by (i) "efficiency hypothesis" i.e. regardless of how rights are initially assigned, the resulting allocation of resources will be efficient, and (ii) "invariance hypothesis", i.e. the final allocation of resources will be invariant under alternative assignments of rights 42 2 (16), 2017, p. 34-57 other words, under the assumption of zero transaction cost, the outcome of transactions will be efficient regardless the legal regulation. That is, if transactions are costless, the allocation of rights or obligations is irrelevant. The transactions will always be efficient, legal rightsperfect and legal certainty -absolute. Accordingly, if law is irrelevant and the outcomes of transactions are always efficient, the state of zero transaction cost also means the state without the need of laws and lawyers. The state of self-governance.
Realizing that such proposition is too naïve to consider seriously, the state of zero transaction costs has always been seen as utopic idea -"a very unrealistic assumption", according to Coase 43 . Indeed, neither science, nor fiction has ever demonstrated complete and persuasive view of what it would be to live in the world where there is no need to have legislative, executive and judicial branches of government. Thus, the real message of Coase was to study the World with positive transaction costs 44 -the World with the market failures. Transaction costs may also be seen as the difference between perfect world and real world. These costs have also been defined as the "costs of running the economic system" 45 and conceptually equated to "frictions in physical systems" 46 , constituting the major economic efficiency problem 47 . Moreover, since efficiency and justice coincide in many ways 48 , the transaction costs are a legal problem, too. Thus diminishing of the transaction costs is the prime aim of regulation and regulators 49 . In order to diminish the risks of these transaction costs in the future, transacting one has to invest in pre-transaction research, analysis of data and development the protection instruments (legal or physical). These costs of transacting are incurred ExAnte.
Of course, the more investments are made at the pre-transaction stage, the less is the risk of post-transaction breach. However, human body, mind and resources have their limits, which together with future uncertainty makes it impossible to determine complete set of risks and to employ preemptive means to avoid all of them. Moreover, every symbol or action (even silence) used in the pre-transaction process has its own hermeneutical risk, which might be the source of misinterpretation and hence error in the enforcement procedure. Lastly, pretransaction investments are based on the assumptions about future events, which are impossible or too costly to determine with absolute certainty. Despite the fact that future risks are only probable, the investments in security measures are inevitable. Due to these shortages, the transacting one may decide to absorb the costs of incomplete transaction 50 If ExAnte stage protection fails, the parties are forced towards the process of adaptation through the state enforcement tools and/or sunk cost. In any of the scenarios the parties suffer from failures of protection in pre-transaction stage. These are the ExPost transaction costs.
According to Richard A. Posner 51 , Transaction Costs (TC) are the sum of ExAnte costs (x) and risk (y) that ExPost costs (z) might occur. Thus the sum of transaction costs might be expressed as:
In the zero transaction costs (ideal) world, there are no ExPost transaction costs (y = 0). In this case y * z = 0, thus there is no need of safety measures, thus x = 0 and TC = 0. Hence, transactions are self-enforcing; the demand for regulation and enforcement services disappears. The market is works without a cost and need for law or lawyers. However, since the zero transaction cost state is deemed to be utopic, a state without ExPost transaction costs (y = 0) means that protection in pre-transaction stage is absolutely complete, with perfect rationality and full certainty of a future. This is a complete pre-crime society.
In either way, costless society is indeed a very unrealistic assumption and variables that causes market failures has to be taken into account solving regulation issues. These variables (either ExAnte or ExPost) were identified and elaborated by Williamson 52 (and others) and may be summarized into such groups: 1) Bounded rationality, which describes the limited cognitive competences and lingual limits of people 53 ;
2)
Opportunism, which describes the self-interested nature of people that is sometimes led by the element of the guile in transaction 54 ;
3)
Uncertainty, which describes the future state of nature, price and demand levels, innovations, legal and behavioural instabilities and many other characteristics, which are unclear and which make it impossible to predict the outcome of one's promises 55 . Uncertainty and bounded rationality are sometimes characterized as informational and cognitive inability 56 .
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Asset specificity, which usually describes six types of specific assets 57 that create critical dependency on the scarce resources, and identity of the transacting actor 58 . Bounded rationality and uncertainty make it impossible to evaluate all the risks related to relevant transactions and safeguards at the ExAnte stage. Thus all transactions are incomplete 59 . Opportunism and asset specificity make all transactions not self -enforcing, which in turn creates the demand for government system (i.e. laws and lawyers). These transaction cost variables, causing the market failures and thus demanding regulation, may be visualized as in Figure 3 below. Since the major task of regulation is to diminish transaction costs, with regard to ExAnte costs it implies the duty to foster access to data and computing power to process it (thus diminishing perils of uncertainty and bounded rationality). With regard to ExPost -the duty to foster accessibility to governance system and diminish dependency on scarce resources (thus diminishing the perils of opportunism and asset specificity).
Fixing of market failures is done through regulation -laws made by regulators using the powers delegated to them by the society. The discretion limits are usually analyzed through the lens of fundamental values of the society, such as right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness (property).
Within the tri-tier institutional structure of society 61 and ontology of law 62 , the conceptual holistic model of regulation, integrating fundamental values of society, transaction and variables of transaction cost, may be developed (see Figure 4) . 57 These are: (i) site specificity; (ii) physical asset specificity; (iii) dedicated assets; (iv) human asset specificity; (v) intangible assets; (vi) temporal specificity. 58 The middle part of the model is the level of regulation, where regulatory institutions are forming regulatory measures and vice versa -the need for regulatory measures shapes the institutional setting. It encompasses the setting of laws and lawyers, i.e. the linear system of three branches of government with all the checks and balances. At the middle level the transition from the level of regulation to the level of transaction and back is carried out. It means that regulatory measures shape the market transactions. However, market is very dynamic, it is constantly innovating and therefore the regulation level is also under the direct influence of market transactions.
Lastly, the bottom part of the model is the place of the transaction and its cost variables, which, according to Williamson 63 , are the reason for market failures. The everyday world is at a constant demand for regulation due to the market failures. Assumedly these failures result from the same transaction costs -inevitable part of the human nature to err. Standard model of regulation rests on human intelligence, which is limitedly rational, opportunistic, and performed under the uncertainty and asset specificity.
Furthermore, it is assumed that the standard model of regulation may fail in the four transition points between the ontological levels of law and institutions. First of all, the government may fail to interpret its discretion boundaries (values-to-regulation transition). Then government may abuse or fail to use its power (regulation-to-transactions transition). The third one involves the failure of government to interpret the market signals (transactionsto-regulation transition). Lastly, the powers given to government may be abused or failed to use for anchoring the fundamental values of a given society (government-to-values transition). 63 See footnote 61. (16), 2017, p. 34-57 Assumedly these failures result from the same transaction costs -inevitable part of the human nature to err. Standard model of regulation rests on human intelligence, which is limitedly rational, opportunistic, and performed under the uncertainty and asset specificity. Human actors at the middle and bottom levels are behaving rather in the same intelligence and behavioural capacity, although with the different type of transactions 64 . In other words it doesn't matter how many cyber security agencies or super-agencies will be at the regulation level, as long as there are humans involved, the regulation will not be failure -free. In sum, the standard model of regulation in action may be presented as in Figure 5 .
Figure 5. Standard model of regulation in practice
Therefore, it should be emphasized that most of the cyber security strategies and regulation models rest on the human reactions and decisions, integrating the risk of human nature to err. Indeed, only 48% percent of data security breaches are caused by acts of malicious intent. Human error or system failure accounts for the rest. 65 Verizon 2016 Data Breach Investigations Report 66 reveals that cybercriminals are continuing to exploit human nature as they rely on familiar attack patterns such as phishing. 95 percent of breaches and 86 percent of security incidents fall into nine patterns. Sixty-three (63) percent of confirmed data breaches involve using weak, default or stolen passwords. Most attacks exploit known 64 Bottom level is filled with the resource allocation transactions and middle level -with the state power transactions. 65 Teisės apžvalga Law review No. 2 (16), 2017, p. 34-57 vulnerabilities that have never been patched despite patches being available for months, or even years. In fact, the top 10 known vulnerabilities account for 85 percent of successful exploit. All findings boil down to the human element. Indeed, misaligned incentives of human being is more often a source of information insecurity, rather than the lack of suitable technical protections 67 . Unfortunately, most of the cyber defence systems tend to rely on humans who try to anticipate what the other human might do before they do it. However, neither kinetical nor digital firewalls will stop a determined hacker, exploiting vulnerabilities of the humans. Postbreach reactions also tend to rely on humans, who are dealing with jurisdictional fragmentation and attribution of behaviour. On either stage, government faces additional socalled "Going Dark" problem, which refers to situations in which government has legally obtained the right to search certain devices but has no technical ability to carry out those orders of court 68 . Moreover, these problems and conflicts arise when government seeks to obtain information for the purposes of investigating or thwarting crimes, but cannot bypass the encrypted information even when it has the accompanying devices in its possession 69 . In order to overcome "Going Dark" problem, the government is using its powers to compel private companies to assist them in accessing encrypted devices. These attempts have caused extreme tension with regard to privacy and other backdoor problems 70 . This debate might be highlighted by example of the US Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act ("CISA"), adopted in 2015, which has established a core real-time cybersecurity information sharing framework between private entities and the federal government. While its goal may be commendable, CISA has been criticized by inter alia Apple, Google, Amazon and Microsoft mostly with privacy, civil liberties and transparency related arguments 71 . The recent FBI and Apple encryption dispute in the San Bernardino Case 72 has exposed the major critical arguments supporting both sides of the paradox. On one hand, government asked Apple to create a backdoor to the iPhone 5C used in a 2015 San Bernardino terrorist attack that killed 14 people and seriously injured 22. Apple appealed arguing that government is asking for something that is too dangerous to create 73 . These arguments were supported by many, including the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, who warned the FBI that unlocking a Pandora's box possesses the potential for "extremely damaging implications" on human rights 74 . Indeed, the Snowden leaks and other total surveillance attempts 75 have clearly demonstrated that humans involved in regulation are also vulnerable to opportunistically misuse of the private information collected. That is, distrust in personal data mismanagement extends to governmental institutions, thus requiring for protection measures from human vulnerabilities.
Nuclear option in privacy law would require treating privacy not as a law, but rather as a privilege. This perspective would open all private data to the government until the privilege to be forgotten is earned through a trustworthy behaviour. This option would be in alignment with the very idea of opportunism, which describes the self-interest nature of people. Transaction cost theory is based on a presumption of opportunistic behaviour, since it is too costly (or even impossible) to determine in advance whether individual actor is capable of acting opportunistically or not. General law, however, is based on the presumption of honesty, which protects all the actors (including hackers) from intervention to their privacy, until there is enough proofs of actual or potential threat to security. Thus nuclear option in privacy law would bypass "Going Dark" problem and would ensure maximum security available with the use of status quo technologies.
However, this option would also require a trust-free governance of the data collected. A cryptographic governance system, which should be organized very much alike blockchain -both autonomously and in a networked-based collective (distributed) nature, without any point of central control or single point of failure. Such technology, merging a cryptography with governance on a digital platform, if possible at all, might lead to the trustfree governance, which embraces the emerging digital lifestyle. Intelligent machines can be trained to constantly analyze patterns in order to identify any deviation in it, much like a human counterpart does, just much faster, cheaper and in higher details of variations. Moreover, it may constantly use existing data to learn and enhance its functionalities and cyber warfare strategies. Using process mining methodology 76 for transaction pattern analysis, such system could be shown as in Figure 6 . This proposition is in line with the suggestion of that artificial intelligence presents a solution to the issues of human error and slow response time 77 . An artificially intelligent machine that is capable of autonomously learning and performing defensive and offensive strategies would be invaluable in the digital age. The issue remains -is the possibility of such framework a very unrealistic assumption in the context of developments in legal technologies?
IN LIEU OF CONCLUSIONS: THE GENESIS OF LEGAL TECHNOLOGIES
The rapid and exponential growth of data, its computation and storage capacity has led to the recent rise of legal technologies (LegalTech) and evolution of new search, drafting and control techniques. The trend of this industry is promising. 80 and Dartmouth Summer Research Project on Artificial Intelligence in 1956, the field of artificial intelligence studies has been widely accepted as a field of science rather than fiction, and has captured some of the greatest minds since. At the same time lawyers started their discussion on the use of artificial intelligence in law 81 . The works of Loevinger 82 , Allen 83 , Mehl 84 , for example, could be regarded as the introduction to scientific and practical researches in this field, but the onset of application of artificial intelligence in law is usually related to the article by Buchanan and Headrick 85 "Some speculation about artificial intelligence and legal reasoning"
The practical experiments of synthesis of artificial intelligence and legal processes on the ground of these conceptual ideas did not take long. 91 are considered to be influential scientific works in the area of artificial intelligence and law.
The International Conference on AI and Law (ICAIL) was started in 1987 and continued annually. At present it has become the main forum of application of artificial intelligence in law. These conferences resulted in establishment of the International Association for Artificial Intelligence and Law (IAAIL) and start of the Artificial Intelligence and Law Journal. It did not take long for the movement to involve not only the USA, but also Europe (e.g.. JURIX conferences), Japan (e.g., JURISIN workshop) and other countries.
Thus, academic discourse on artificial intelligence and law is celebrating more than 50 years of development. However, so far only primitive artificial intelligence systems have been found in legal practice. As Isaac Asimov has predicted with the punctilio of accuracy, robots are neither common, nor very good in 2014, but they are in existence
92
. Thus the cognitive skills of superior level characteristic to the lawyer's profession are unattainable for the systems of artificial intelligence yet.
Nevertheless, the rapid technological development 93 and the current market trends (such as Google quantum supercomputer, digital copy of oneself 94 , etc.) suggest that primitive artificial intelligence is gaining new properties and abilities that very soon will surpass their human counterparts. This process is accelerating. It is recognized in scientific literature that the latest technologies are and will continue changing the legal industry essentially.
Even with its limited capabilities the first generation of LegalTech has already disrupted the legal market 95 and applications for using artificial intelligence are rapidly growing. From a chat-bot that gives advice whether you have to pay your parking ticket 96 , artificial intelligence enabled document creation or review 97 103 to handle their bankruptcy practice, which at the moment consists of nearly 50 lawyers. 104 One of the primary reasons for such increase in LegalTech is due to the increased accessibility to neural networking models and other probabilistic algorithms. Further automation of law is streaming especially to quantitative legal prediction 105 , machine learning 106 , and other fields of scientific and practical legal problems. Professor Richard Susskind predicts unprecedented upheaval in a profession where the working practices of some lawyers and judges have changed little since the time of Charles Dickens. According to him, there will be anything dramatic, but there will be an incremental transformations in areas like the way legal documents are reviewed, legal risk is assessed and the way decisions are made 107 . Taking into account the probability that artificial intelligence might transcend the human one, the trend of legal technologies development allows to hope for a universal framework of cyber security regulation that would preclude perils of human nature to err and overcome problems of jurisdictional fragmentation and attribution of behaviour.
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